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THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
of cattle which had escaped from the fenced area by virtue of
defendant's trespass and the third item was for damage to
woods, gates, et cetera.
The court refused to allow damages for the acreage already
under lease as the reversionary value for releasing was too
speculative both as to whether it would ever revert in the first
place and second as to possible leasing value if and when it did.
Royalty value was also refused as no appreciable market value
could be proved nor could it be shown that the survey had
affected the value in any way. The court pointed out that "the
price of royalty is controlled solely by the demand."3 3
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Marriage
State v. Golden' presented the issue whether a marriage
celebrated in violation of Article 92 of the Civil Code is null.
The article forbids priests, ministers, and magistrates to marry
males under eighteen or females under sixteen years of age. It
does not contain language indicating nullity of such marriages.
Nor does it contain within itself any reference which would lead
to that conclusion, such as a declaration that the ages listed are
the minimum ages for marriage. The only reason for inferring
nullity of the marriage celebrated in violation of Article 92 would
be the article's position in the same chapter with other articles
on causes of nullity of marriage. The supreme court interpreted
the article literally as no more than a prohibition on celebrants
and accordingly decided the marriage was valid .2 It was affirmed
by implication in State v. Priest.3
The marriage issue in Cameron v. Rowland4 was one of fact
only, whether the plaintiff's mother and alleged father, both de-
ceased, had ever married. There being no direct proof of the fact
of marriage, the court relied on the general reputation which the
parties enjoyed and numerous acts of the parties indicative of
33. 209 La. 1014, 1027, 26 So.(2d) 20, 24.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Golden, 26 So. (2d) 837 (La. 1946).
2. The case will be more fully discussed in a note in the March issue of
the Review.
3. 27 So. (2d) 173 (La. 1946). See discussion of case infra, page 226.
4. 208 La. 663, 23 So. (2d) 285 (1945).
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the existence of a legitimate relation. This type of evidence is
always acceptable if better evidence is not obtainable.5
Separation
Incompatibility of tempers is not a cause for separation or
divorce in Louisiana, but no cause other than two years volun-
tary separation need be alleged for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce under Act 430 of 1938. Nevertheless, because the period
for obtaining final divorce under that act is one year longer than
that for divorce following separation from bed and board under
Article 138 of the Civil Code and because the issue of fault can-
not be avoided if the husband contests the wife's claim for ali-
mony, there are frequent attempts to have any difficulties con-
strued as "cruel treatment." Schneider v. Schneider0 seems to
have been such a case. The supreme court found from the evi-
dence that the alleged cruel treatment-if any existed at all-
was a direct result of incompatibility and refused to allow the
separation.
Divorce
Four cases were decided on Act 430 of 1938, allowing divorce
on basis of two years separation. Two consider the manner in
which the separation might begin and two consider the "resi-
dence" requirement of the act.
Davis v. Watts' involved separation of husband and wife six
months before the husband's induction into the armed services
and the contention that the period of time spent in the armed
forces could not be considered "separation" within the terms of
the act. The court merely affirmed that such period could be
considered "inasmuch as the separation took place prior to the
husband's entry into the armed forces." This decision is in line
with Vincent v. LeDoux8 in which divorce was allowed even
though the period of separation commenced voluntarily and had
not been completed before the wife's confinement in an insane
asylum.In Otis v. Bahan9 the plaintiff husband contended the wife
left him while he was away in the armed forces. The court ap-
parently was willing to consider the possibility of such a separa-
5. See, for example, Oliphant v. Louisiana Long Leaf Lumber Co., 163
La. 601, 112 So. 500 (1927).
6. 209 La. 925, 25 So. (2d) 900 (1946).
7. 208 La. 290, 23 So. (2d) 97 (1945), noted in (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAw
REVEIw 472.
8. 146 La. 144, 83 So. 439 (1919).
9. 209 La. 1082, 26 So. (2d) 146 (1946).
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tion under the act, but it concluded that the separation had not
been proved.
In the opinion of the writer, these judgments are ill-advised.
It seems that Act 430 of 1938 was designed to allow divorces to
such persons as might demonstrate for a full two years that they
are irreconcilable. Reconciliation is not probable if the parties
have not the opportunity of coming together. It would seem es-
pecially unwise to allow commencement of a period of separa-
tion while a meeting of the parties is impossible because of con-
ditions beyond their control. The trial is not being fulfilled for
the two year period. Cases such as Vincent v. LeDoux 0 and Le-
veque v. Borns,1I involving separation by reason of confinement
for insanity, present a separate problem: the admissibility of
divorces if one party cannot fulfill the marriage obligations. If
divorce is to be allowed in such situation, it should be by amend-
ment to Article 139 of the Civil Code, which lists the causes for
divorce. The writer does not wish to indicate he would approve
such a provision, but merely wishes to emphasize that divorce
on grounds of two years separation should be allowed only if the
parties have had a two-year opportunity to effect reconciliation
and have failed so to do.
The cases of Spratt v. Spratt12 and Spring v. Spring"3 both
interpreted the residence requirement of Act 430 of 1938 as a
requirement of domicile. This interpretation has been constant
since Lepenser v. Griffin4 in 1920. Spratt v. Spratt applied this
interpretation to the facts presented therein. Spring v. Spring
was in the same vein, but the actual decision seems to have
rested on the failure of the plaintiff, a soldier stationed at Barks-
dale Field for over two years, to show that he ever performed
any act which would evidence an intention to remain in Lou-
isiana as a domiciliary of the state.
Reconciliation. Articles 152-154 of the Civil Code provide
that the action of separation from bed and board or of divorce
shall be extinguished by a reconciliation of the parties, either
after the facts which might have given grounds to such action
or after the action has been commenced, but fail to define re-
conciliation. In Hornsby v. Hornsby5 the defendant contended
10. Supra, note 8.
11. 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932).
12. 27 So. (2d) 154 (La. 1946).
13. 27 So. (2d) 358 (La. 1946).
14. 146 La. 584, 83 So. 839 (1919).
15. 208 La. 316, 23 So.(2d) 105 (1945).
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that the wife's continuance to live with him until she abandoned
him for the purpose of bringing suit amounted to "reconcilia-
tion" and a forgiveness of prior cruel treatment. The wife's an-
swer was simply that she had endured the offenses of her hus-
band as long as she could and of course the supreme court did
not consider her action a reconciliation. In its ordinary connota-
tion, reconciliation implies previous break in marital relations,
but such cannot be required even if only to prevent resurrection
of long forgotten offenses for the purpose of obtaining a separa-
tion or divorce at a time when lawful grounds do not exist. In
the last analysis, it should be for the court to decide whether the
facts indicate that the offended spouse has so forgiven the of-
fending spouse as to renounce the right to sue for separation or
divorce. This seems to be the view taken in France on the similar
provision in Article 244 of the French Civil Code. 16
Alimony judgments. In Comstock v. Bourge 7 alimony in
the amount of thirteen dollars per week was awarded in the
divorce judgment, an amount which coincided with that being
paid under order of juvenile court. The husband then obtained
an ex parte amendment of the "wording" of the judgment by
which the words "Thirteen... Dollars per week" were elimi-
nated and "alimony as set by order of the Juvenile Court" in-
serted. The husband's attorney then secured dismissal of the
prosecution in the juvenile court. The question before the su-
preme court was whether the dismissal of prosecution in juvenile
court put an end to the district court's alimony judgment. The
supreme court found that it had not and that the amendment to
the original judgment was simply one of words and not one of
substance. To have decided otherwise would have been the
equivalent of a judicial authorization to the district court to dele-
gate its power to fix alimony. It is difficult to understand why
the district court allowed the amendment in the first place.
In Blank v. Barrileaux5 a divorce judgment in favor of the
plaintiff husband on grounds of two years separation failed to
award alimony to the wife or to mention whether she had been
denied alimony, for fault, under Article 160 of the Civil Code.
The supreme court was able to affirm the decision on the basis
that the husband's income in relation to that of the wife as
indicated by the evidence did not warrant award of alimony. In-
16. Planiol, Tratte elenentaire de droit civil (12 ed. 1939) no. 1208.
17. 210 La. 20, 26 So. (2d) 220 (1946).
18. 210 La. 116, 26 So. (2d) 473 (1946).
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asmuch, however, as it could not be determined from the record
whether the lower court's decision was based on a finding of
fault on the part of the wife or on the inability of the husband
to pay, the supreme court declared that the wife would not be
precluded from suing for alimony when the relative financial
situations of the ex-spouses changed and that the issue of fault
could be determined at that time.
Although the supreme court could not decide otherwise, the
situation is most unfortunate. If the lower court's decision was
based on the relative financial position of the parties and a find-
ing of no fault on the part of the wife, the wife will be com-
pelled to prove again her freedom from fault in any future suit
for alimony. Conceivably she might then fail where she had
once succeeded. If the decision was based on ihe wife's fault,
then the husband may be prejudiced by a different finding on
the evidence produced in a future suit. Article VII, Section 43,
of the Louisiana Constitution requires a judge to render written
findings of fact and reasons for judgment in contested appeal-
able non-jury cases only if requested by either party. Attorneys
hesitate to demand reasons or findings of lower court judges.
The only satisfactory remedy would be a legislative requirement
to that effect.
Custody of Children
Although the general scheme of our legislation warrants the
statement that custody of children belongs to both parents, if
married and not separated, and to the tutor in all other instances,
Act 79 of 1894 authorizes the judicial removal of custody from
anyone to anyone else "as may be available and in [the judge's]
judgment most suitable," if the "physical or moral welfare" of
the child "is seriously endangered by the neglect, abuse, or the
vicious, or immoral habits or associations" of the person having
custody, or by such person's "inability, refusal or neglect" prop-
erly to care for such child. Enlarging on the policy announced
in this act, which extends only to cases of serious danger to the
physical or moral welfare of children, the supreme court has
adopted the principle that the child's welfare is paramount in
all cases. Little more than lip-service is paid to custody aspects
of paternal authority or tutorship.
The custody cases decided during the 1945-1946 term are no
exceptions. In State ex rel. Munson v. Jackson9 and in State ex
19. 210 La. 1, 26 So. (2d) 152 (1946).
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rel. Guinn v. Watson21 the supreme court allowed strangers to
retain actual custody of illegitimate children against their moth-
ers. In the Jackson case the evidence was not clear as to whether
the relator had lost custody voluntarily, but it appeared she was
the mother of three illegitimates by as many men and of un-
steady income. In the Watson case, the mother seemed to be a
good woman, guilty only of the transgression which resulted in
the birth of the child, and happily married at the time of suit
to a man who seems to have desired to rear the child as his own.
Yet the supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny
her custody, considering "not only... the mother's rights, but
also the future welfare and best interests of the child." The de-
cision seems harsh, for the mother had placed the child with the
defendants at a time when she could not care for it; but it is in.
accord with the adopted policy of the supreme court and with
the spirit of Article 213 of the Civil Code, according to which
parents may not reclaim "foundlings" from persons who have
received and reared them unless the child was taken from them
by force, fraud, or accident.
The spirit of Article 213 was detectable as well in State ex
rel. Conerly v. Sonier.2' The shiftless claimant had shown no
interest in his child until its stepfather (the mother had remar-
ried after divorcing the child's father) made it the beneficiary of
a $10,000 insurance policy and recipient of a thirty dollar allow-
ance as a soldier's dependent. The supreme court allowed the
maternal grandmother, who had cared for it since the mother's
death, to retain custody.
The supreme court's policy extends even to contests over
children pending separation or divorce suits. Article 146 of the
Civil Code specifies award of custody in such cases to the mother
"unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her of it."
Construing this article with Article 157 of the Civil Code, there is
no doubt that the Civil Code contemplates award of custody to
parents only and not to other persons. Nevertheless, in State ex rel.
Theriot v. Pulling22-a case begun as a habeas corpus proceeding
but converted into an issue of custody pendente lite by the sub-
sequent filing of a suit for separation-the supreme court af-
firmed the decision of the district court awarding custody of the
child to the paternal grandparents upon a showing of the moth-
er's "unfitness" and the father's absence with the armed forces.
20. 210 La. 265, 26 So. (2d) 740 (1946).
21. 209 La. 138, 24 So. (2d) 290 (1945).
22. 209 La. 871, 25 So. (2d) 620 (1946).
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A serious consequence of the supreme court's policy of welfare
of the child above all is exemplified by the cases involving custody
after separation or divorce. Article 157 of the Civil Code estab-
lishes as a basic principle that the party against whom the sepa-
ration or divorce has been rendered should not have custody of
the child. Exception is authorized if the judge in his discretion
believes that all or some of the children should, for their best
interests, be awarded to the party at fault. The supreme court
has gone beyond this, in effect ignoring the primary policy of
the article and considering only the welfare of the child. As the
welfare of young children seems to warrant custody to the moth-
er except for serious reasons and as change of custody except
for serious reasons seems frowned upon, the innocent husband
who is forced to seek separation or divorce because of the faults
of his wife often loses forever the possibility of guiding and
watching the development of his children. Little consideration
seems to be given to the fact that the mother whose fault
prompted her husband's action actually has already deprived
the child of the greatest advantage it could have, a happy family
life. When to this is added the inquiry whether a person respons-
ible for disrupting conjugal life can be the better influence for
creating a proper attitude toward married life, doubt is cast on
the soundness of the well intended policy of the supreme court.
Willis v. Willis 23 and Sanford v. Sanford24 were two cases in
which these considerations appeared strongly. In the first, the
husband who had obtained separation from bed and board on
grounds of abandonment was denied custody although the lower
court's decision in his favor would seem to indicate he was a
fit person. In the second case, the husband had obtained separa-
tion and later divorce on grounds of cruel treatment. He had
been denied custody at the time of the separation judgment,
probably because the child was then not quite five months old.
In the present suit, five years later and after the remarriage of
the mother and her contemplated permanent emigration from
the state, the trial judge had awarded custody to the father. The
supreme court reversed the decision.
In the above cases we have additional evidence of the need
of written findings of fact and reasons for decision.25 In both the
Willis and Sanford cases the supreme court felt compelled to re-
23. 209 La. 205, 24 So. (2d) 378 (1945).
24. 208 La. 1073, 24 So. (2d) 145 (1945).
25. See discussion of Blank v. Barrileaux, 210 La. 116, 26 So. (2d) 473
(1946), supra, page 220.
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verse the lower court's decisions although in neither did it have
the advantage of knowing why the trial judge had decided in
favor of the other party. The supreme court should have power
to reverse the lower court's findings or decision, if such findings
or decision clearly are unwarranted, but the supreme court
should at least have the benefit of knowing the bases of the
lower court's action. A transcript of evidence is not sufficient in
this respect.
A final case on custody of children, that of Veillon v. Lan-
dreneau,2 16 involved only questions of fact to which the supreme
court applied its policy of awarding custody of the child to the
mother if at all possible. The principal reason for opposing award
of custody to the mother was an alleged "lack of interest" as
manifested by her voluntary surrender of the child to its father
pending the litigation. The supreme court found she had done
so because her emotional condition at the time of suit would
have prevented her from giving it proper care. The facts, of
course, distinguish this case from that of State ex rel. Guinn v.
Watson, discussed above,27 in which a mother had surrendered
her illegitimate child to strangers because she could not care for
it and sought its custody two and a half years later.
Filiation and Legitimacy
In Cameron v. Rowland,28 the marriage aspect of which was
dicussed above,29 a child sought to prove paternal filiation and
the legitimacy thereof so as to recover property in her alleged
father's succession then in the hands of his widow by a second
marriage. The plaintiff alleged marriage of her deceased mother
and her alleged father and issue from this union. The defendant
denied both the paternal filiation and the marriage. Maternity
was not at issue. The supreme court quoted the opinion of the
judge below in which he discussed and considered proved, in
order, the marriage, the paternal filiation, and the date of the
plaintiff's birth. It is worthy of note that Articles 193-197 of the
Civil Code were correctly applied to this situation. Articles 184-
192 apply only to the case of the child who is known and ad-
mitted to have been born of a woman during marriage or within
three hundred days thereafter, and actually treats only of pre-
sumptions of conception by the husband of the mother. If the
26. 209 La. 1060, 26 So. (2d) 139 (1946).
27. See p. 222, supra.
28. 208 La. 663, 23 So. (2d) 285 (1945).
29. See p. 217, supra.
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child does not enjoy the reputation of birth during the period
above mentioned, Articles 193-197 apply.
Legitimation
Before amendment of Act 50 of 1944, Article 198 declared
that illegitimate children of parents who could have married at
the time of conception were legitimated by the marriage of their
parents "whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them
for their children, either before their marriage by an act passed
before a notary and two witnesses, or by their contract of mar-
riage itself. In Cormier v. Cormier30 the supreme court had in-
terpreted the italicized words to mean "at the time of the cele-
bration" and as early as Succession of Fortier (1899)3 1 had de-
clared sufficient a verbal acknowledgment at the time of the
celebration. The situation in Succession of Cambre32 was identi-
cal with that in the Fortier case and the supreme court decided
the former on the basis of the latter. Although there may be
question as to the correctness of the Fortier case-and possibly
even of the Cormier case-their spirit received legislative sanc-
tion in Article 198 as amended by Act 50 of 1944, and that article
now provides that marriage will have the effect of legitimating
children if their parents acknowledge them formally or inform-
ally, before or after marriage. As the facts in the Cambre case
occurred before the amendment of Article 198, the decision could
have been based either on that article as interpreted in the
Fortier case or, by giving the amendment retroactive effect, on
the article as amended. It chose the former solution and thereby
avoided considering the retroactive, or remedial character, of the
amendment.
Curatorship
The sole question in the Curatorship of Parks" was whether
the curator appointed under Act 71 of 1932 (amended and reen-
acted by Act 256 of 1944), the so-called "Veteran's Guardian-
ship Act," could sell the home of the ward and purchase another
with the proceeds of the sale. The act provides for the purchase
of a home with proceeds obtained from the Veterans Administra-
tion, but failed to provide expressly for the contemplated trans-
action. The court decided in the affirmative by considering the
30. 185 La. 968, 171 So. 93 (1936).
31. 51 La. Ann. 1562, 26 So. 554 (1899).
32. 27 So. (2d) 296 (La. 1946).
33. 210 La. 63, 26 So. (2d) 289 (1946).
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purpose and object of the act. This is valid procedure under
Article 18 of the Civil Code. The court, however, instead of
simply citing that article, went to the needless trouble of noting
previous cases and a common law authority.
Minors
State v. Priests' was an attempt in juvenile court, Caddo
Parish, to compel a fifteen year old married woman to attend
school. Act 239 of 1944 requires minors under sixteen years of
age to be sent to school by their parents, "guardians" or other
persons having "control or charge" of them and makes no ex-
ception for emancipated minors or married minors. The court
decided that compulsory attendance at school was inconsistent
with the married state and that a married woman could not be
considered within the terms of the act. To give the decision legal
form, the court noted that the woman had been emancipated by
marriage under Article 379 of the Civil Code and that, although
the act creating the juvenile courts for Caddo and Orleans Par-
ishes did not so specify, the act creating the juvenile courts in
other parishes expressly negatived jurisdiction over emancipated
minors. This case is a good example of a court's adjustment of
faulty new legislation to the general scheme of other legislation.
Emancipation
In State v. Priest, above, the emancipation of the married
woman involved was not contested. It will be recalled that Guil-
lebert v. Grenier,5 decided in 1902 against strong dissent, fixed
the jurisprudence of the supreme court denying emancipation by
marriage to minors marrying without consent of parents or tu-
tors. The Succession of Hecker,", decided in 1938, partially elimi-
nated this incongruity of married persons under tutorship by
seizing upon a 1908 amendment of Article 382 of the Civil Code"
to declare emancipated all married persons of eighteen years of
age, whether the marriage had been contracted with or without
consent of parents or tutors. As yet, however, the Guillebert v.
Grenier jurisprudence seems to hold in cases of minors not yet
eighteen years of age and married without such consent.
In State v. Golden" the supreme court had an excellent op-
34. 27 So. (2d) 173 (La. 1946).
35. 107 La. 614, 62 So. 238 (1902).
36. 191 La. 302, 185 So. 32 (1938), noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw
457.
37. Article 382, La. Civil Code of 1870 as amended by Act 224 of 1908.
38. 210 La. 347, 26 So.(2d) 837 (1946), the marriage aspect of which is
considered at page 217, supra.
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portunity to overrule this unfortunate jurisprudence. It restrain-
ed itself, however, to the mere statement that the status of mar-
riage was incompatible with parental custody.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
During the period here being considered, the supreme court
had before it nine cases under this title involving the admissi-
bility of parol evidence in relation to a written act. In general,
the cases adhere to the view that except where fraud or error
is alleged or the act is indefinite or ambiguous parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary or contradict any recital, whether factual
or promissory, contained therein. A further limitation exists in
the rule that where a charge of error rests only a lack of knowl-
edge concerning the provisions of the act, occasioned by a failure
to read it or to listen attentively while it is being read, relief
will not be granted.
The last mentioned rule was relied on in Rousseau v. Rous-
seau,1 in rejecting an offer of parol evidence to contradict a re-
cital that the property covered by a deed was being purchased
with the wife's paraphernal funds.
The rule that parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of
explaining the terms used in a written act if they are incomplete
or their meaning is uncertain was applied in Walker v. Fer-
chaud2 to complete the description of the property covered by
an offer to purchase which referred to it only by its municipal
street number, and in Plaquemines Oil and Development Com-
pany v. State" to explain the meaning of the words "east" and
"west" in a patent prepared by the Registrar of the State Land
Office. Similar evidence was admitted in Krauss v. Fry' to ex-
plain the true intention of the parties in a deed containing a
mineral reservation clause.
A kindred problem was presented in Gulf Refining Company
v. Garrett.5 The dispute concerned the interpretation of a settle-
ment agreement between a widow and certain heirs of the dece-
dent. On rehearing the case was remanded for the introduction
of parol evidence. The Chief Justice and Judge Rogers dissented,
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 La. 428, 24 So.(2d) 676 (1946).
2. 210 La. 283, 26 So.(2d) 746 (1946).
3. 208 La. 425, 23 So.(2d) 171 (1945).
4. 209 La. 250, 24 So.(2d) 464 (1945).
5. 209 La 674, 25 So.(2d) 329 (1946).
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